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Abstract
A number of criticisms of Utilitarianism – such as “nearest and dearest” objections,
“demandingness” objections, and “altruistic” objections – arise because Utilitarian-
ism doesn’t permit partially or wholly disregarding the utility of certain subjects. A
number of authors, including Sider (1993), Portmore (2008), and Vessel (2010), have
responded to these objections by suggesting we adopt “dual-maximizing” theories
which provide a way to incorporate disregarding. And in response to “altruistic”
objections in particular – objections noting that it seems permissible to make utility-
decreasing sacrifices – these authors have suggested adopting a dual-maximizing the-
ory that permits disregarding one’s own utility.
In this paper I’ll defend two claims. First, I’ll argue that dual-maximizing theo-
ries are a poor way to incorporate disregarding. Instead, I’ll suggest that “variable-
disregarding” theories provide a more attractive way to incorporate disregarding.
Second, I’ll argue that the right way to handle these “altruistic” objections isn’t to
permit disregarding one’s own utility, it’s to permit disregarding the utility of those
who consent. Together, these two claims entail that the best way to modify Utilitar-
ianism to handle “altruistic” objections is to adopt a variable-disregarding view that
disregards the utility of those who consent.
1 Introduction
Consider the following case:
Parental Sacrifice: Your child’s birthday is coming up. You have the option of work-
ing overtime in order to buy your child a gift. Doing so would significantly
decrease your utility, a decrease greater than the utility your child would receive
from the gift. No one else’s utility would be affected.
According to objective act Utilitarianism, an act is morally permissible iff it maximizes
total utility. Since working overtime would not maximize total utility, Utilitarianism
entails that it’s impermissible to work overtime to buy your child the gift. But this
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strikes many as the wrong verdict. For while it’s not obligatory to work overtime, it’s
surely permissible to do so.1
The standard diagnosis of this problem is that Utilitarianism provides implausible
prescriptions in cases like Parental Sacrifice because it doesn’t accommodate an im-
portant “self-other asymmetry”. In particular, it doesn’t accommodate the fact that
it’s permissible to disregard one’s own utility when making decisions about how to
act.
The standard remedy is to modify Utilitarianism by adopting an altruistic ver-
sion of what I’ll call a “dual-maximizing” theory. Dual-maximizing theories provide
a particular way of allowing agents to (partially or wholly) disregard the utility of
some group of subjects. And such views have been employed to address a number of
objections to Utilitarianism. In response to “nearest and dearest” objections to Utilitar-
ianism, some have suggested adopting dual-maximizing views that permit partially
disregarding the utility of those one isn’t close to, and thus privileging the utility of
one’s friends and family. In response to “demandingness” objections to Utilitarian-
ism, some have suggested adopting dual-maximizing views that permit partially dis-
regarding the utility of others, and thus privileging one’s own utility. And in response
to “altruistic” objections to Utilitarianism like Parental Sacrifice, some have suggested
adopting dual-maximizing views that permit disregarding one’s own utility, and thus
privileging the utility of others.2
I’ll argue that both the standard diagnosis and the standard remedy are mistaken.
I’ll argue that the standard diagnosis is mistaken because the cases like Parental Sac-
rifice do not demonstrate that it’s permissible to disregard one’s own utility. Rather,
what such cases show us is that it’s permissible to disregard the utility of those who
consent.
And I’ll argue the standard remedy is mistaken because the way in which dual-
maximizing theories permit disregarding the utility of groups of subjects is problem-
atic. I’ll argue that if we want to modify utilitarianism to permit disregarding, we
should do so in a different way, employing what I’ll call a “variable-disregarding”
theory. And this is true not just in the context of “altruistic” objections like Parental
Sacrifice, but in every case in which one might want to permit disregarding.
Note that these two theses are independent of one another. One can accept that
it’s permissible to disregard the utility of those who consent, and deny that the best
way to permit disregarding is via a variable-disregarding theory. And one can accept
that the best way to permit disregarding is via a variable-disregarding theory, and
1I’ve made your child the beneficiary of your sacrifice in order to make the case easy to imagine. But
there’s nothing important about the beneficiary being your child. If you wanted to make such a sacrifice to
benefit a stranger, most would still feel it’s permissible to do so.
2See Smart and Williams (1973) for a classic presentation of the “nearest and dearest” objection, see
Scheffler (1994) for a prominent discussion of “demandingness” objections, and see Slote (1984) for an
influential discussion of “altruistic” objections. See Sider (1993), Portmore (2008) and Vessel (2010) for
suggestions on how to use dual-maximizing views (or multi-maximizing views; cf. footnote 8) to address
these objections.
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deny that it’s permissible to disregard the utility of those who consent. However,
these two theses are independently attractive, and together they entail that cases like
Parental Sacrifice are best accommodated by adopting a variable-disregarding view
that permits disregarding those who consent.
Two preliminary comments before we proceed. First, the issues I discuss in this
paper are relevant to accounts of both subjective obligation (where an agent’s beliefs
mediate what they ought to do) and accounts of objective obligation (where they don’t).3
But for simplicity, I focus my attention here on theories of objective obligation.
Second, the issues discussed in this paper aren’t just relevant to Utilitarianism, but
to many theories that take utility into account.4 For example, consider a hybrid rights
theory that takes rights to be side constraints, but otherwise tells you to maximize
utility. In cases in which no one’s rights are being threatened, this theory will yield
the same prescriptions as Utilitarianism. Thus one can raise “nearest and dearest”,
“demandingness”, and “altruistic” worries for this kind of rights theory too. And it’s
natural to deal with these worries by allowing agents to disregard the utility of cer-
tain groups of subjects. In a similar vein, a typical person-affecting view will yield
the same verdicts as Utilitarianism in cases in which all of the same individuals exist
regardless of what one does. Thus one can raise “nearest and dearest”, “demanding-
ness”, and “altruistic” worries for these person-affecting views. And again it’s natural
to address these worries by allowing agents to disregard the utility of certain groups.
That said, it’s easiest to see our way through these issues when our underlying
theory is as simple and straightforward as possible. So in what follows I’ll focus my
attention on how one might apply these kinds of modifications to Utilitarianism.
The rest of this paper will go as follows. In the second section I present dual-
maximizing theories, show how one can use them to handle cases like Parental Sac-
rifice, and then raise some worries for such theories. In the third section I present
variable-disregarding theories, show one can use them to handle cases like Parental
Sacrifice, and then raise some worries for the standard diagnosis of these cases in
terms of some kind of self-other asymmetry. In the fourth section I make the case for
thinking that the morally important issue that cases like Parental Sacrifice raise is not
the distinction between self and other, but the distinction between giving and with-
holding consent. I then present a variable-disregarding theory that accommodates
the role of consent, show how it handles all the cases discussed so far, and discuss the
conditions required for morally relevant consent. In the fifth section I consider several
objections. In the sixth section I briefly summarize these results.
3For some recent discussions of these issues, see Zimmerman (2006), Sobel (2009) and Graham (2010).
4For some recent examples of other views that one could modify in this way, see Roberts (1998), Preda
(2011) and Meacham (2012).
3
2 Dual-Maximizing Theories
2.1 The Structure of Dual-Maximizing Theories
Utilitarianism says that we should treat all subjects equally. But various objections to
Utilitarianism, such as the “nearest and dearest” objections, “demandingness” objec-
tions, and “altruistic” objections, might make one reconsider this tenet. For while it’s
presumably permissible to treat everyone equally, one might also want to permit par-
tially or wholly disregarding the utility of some subjects, whether it’s other people,
those one doesn’t feel close to, or oneself.
If we want to modify Utilitarianism in order to permit (but not require) disregard-
ing some subjects, one popular option is to adopt a dual-maximizing theory.5 We can
formulate dual-maximizing theories as follows, with respect to some condition φ that
picks out the disregarded subjects, and some weight w ∈ [0, 1] that corresponds to
the degree to which disregarded subjects are taken into account (with w = 0 if we
give the utility of disregarded subjects no weight, and w = 1 if we give the utility of
disregarded subjects full weight):
Dual-Maximizing Theories: An act a is permissible iff either (i) a maximizes utility,
or (ii) a maximizes the sum of (the utility of those who don’t satisfy φ) plus (w
times the utility of those who do satisfy φ).
We’ll spend most of our time focusing on cases in which w = 0, and the utility of
disregarded subjects is completely discounted. In these cases, dual-maximizing the-
ories consider two things: whether an act maximizes utility overall, and whether an
act maximizes utility for the subjects we’re not disregarding. If the answer to either
question is “yes”, then the act is permissible. If the answer to both questions is “no”,
then the act is impermissible.
As Portmore (2008) notes, dual-maximizing theories have several attractive fea-
tures.6 As we saw above, we can use dual-maximizing theories to accommodate
self-centered options, special consideration for one’s friends and family, and self-
sacrificing options. And we can employ dual-maximizing theories to make sense of a
broad range of supererogatory acts. E.g., given a self-centered dual-maximizing the-
ory, there will often be a number of permissible acts which are worse for the agent,
and better for others, than other permissible options.7
5If one wants to modify Utilitarianism to require agents to disregard a group of subjects, then this is
easy to do: one can either change one’s characterization of utility to simply exclude the group in question,
or (equivalently) adopt a theory which tells you to ignore the utility of such subjects when evaluating acts.
Since the question of how to require disregarding is not contentious (unlike the question of how to permit
disregarding), I won’t address it in the text.
6Strictly speaking, Portmore (2008) makes these claims regarding a broader class of theories that he calls
“dual-ranking theories”, which consist of any theory with a pair of conditions (i) and (ii) such that an act is
permissible iff it satisfies one of these conditions. But all of the particular theories Portmore considers are
either dual-maximizing theories or multi-maximizing theories (see footnote 8).
7Of course, how to understand supererogation is controversial, and one might want to cash this no-
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Dual-maximizing theories are a special case of a more general kind of theory we
might call “multi-maximizing theories”, which allow for any number of different dis-
regarded groups with different weights. But to keep things simple, I’ll bracket these
complications and focus on dual-maximizing theories in what follows.8
2.2 Self-Other Utilitarianism
Cases like Parental Sacrifice invoke the intuition that there’s a distinction between
how one takes one’s own utility into consideration and how one takes the utility of
others into consideration. In particular, the intuition is that it’s permissible to disre-
gard one’s own utility when making decisions, but not permissible to disregard the
utility of others. One way to modify Utilitarianism in order to accommodate this intu-
ition is to adopt a dual-maximizing theory, where the condition is being oneself, and
the associated weight w is 0. Doing so yields the following theory, proposed by Sider
(1993):
Self-Other Utilitarianism (SOU): An act a is permissible iff (i) a maximizes the util-
ity of all subjects, or (ii) a maximizes the utility of others.
SOU allows agents to perform acts that decrease overall utility, as long as by doing so
they don’t decrease the utility of anyone but themselves. Thus this theory allows for
permissible self-sacrifice.
SOU yields the desired prescriptions in Parental Sacrifice. Suppose we represent
your options as follows (where the numbers indicate the utility of the relevant subject
given that act):
Options Self Child Total
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 11 19
tion in a number of different ways. And as Vessel (2010) notes, on this understanding of supererogation,
even Utilitarians will admit to some supererogatory acts (since there can be pairs of acts which both maxi-
mize overall utility, one which is worse for the agent and better for others, and one which is better for the
agent and worse for others). Nevertheless, the point remains that there are natural ways of understanding
supererogation according to which self-centered dual-maximizing theories can recognize a much broader
range of supererogatory acts than typical Utilitarian theories can.
8We can formulate multi-maximizing theories as follows, with respect to m conditions φi with associated
weights wi:
Multi-Maximizing Theories: An act a is permissible iff for some is, a maximizes the sum of (the utility of
those who don’t satisfy φi) plus (wi times the utility of those who do satisfy φi).
Multi-maximizing theories offer an appealing generalization of dual-maximizing theories, as they can si-
multaneously permit disregarding others, those one isn’t close to, and oneself. See Portmore (2008) and
Vessel (2010) for formulations of multi-maximizing theories that incorporate multiple kinds of disregard-
ing.
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According to Utilitarianism, it’s impermissible for you to work overtime, since this
option fails to maximize total utility. But according to SOU, both options are permis-
sible. It’s permissible for you to not work overtime because this option maximizes
total utility. And it’s permissible for you to work overtime because this option maxi-
mizes the utility of others.
2.3 Problems For Dual-Maximizing
Although dual-maximizing theories like SOU are attractive in some respects, they
have implausible consequences. To see this, let’s consider a counterexample to SOU
inspired by Splawn (2001) that’s helpful in both identifying the problem with dual-
maximizing, and identifying how to remedy this defect.
Consider a version of Parental Sacrifice in which you have the option of making
both small and large sacrifices:
Variable Parental Sacrifice: Your child’s birthday is coming up. You have the option
of working overtime for a week in order to buy your child a gift, or for two weeks
in order to buy your child an even better gift. Both options would significantly
decrease your utility – in both cases, this decrease would be greater than the
utility your child would receive from the gift. No one else’s utility would be
affected.
In this case we might represent your options as follows:
Options Self Child Total
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 11 19
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 12 19
According to SOU, it’s permissible to not work overtime, since this option maximizes
total utility. Likewise, it’s permissible to work two weeks of overtime, since this op-
tion maximizes the utility of others. But it’s impermissible to work one week of over-
time, since this option maximizes neither total utility nor the utility of others.
This is an implausible result.9 Given the range of options usually available to
agents, it would follow that agents could only make total-utility-decreasing self-sacrifices
9Splawn (2001) offers a criticism of SOU along these lines. Portmore (2008) offers a response, although
he assesses the worry with respect to a kind of multi-maximizing theory he calls “Schefflerian Utilitar-
ianism” instead of SOU, where Schefflerian Utilitarianism takes an act to be permissible iff it either (i)
maximizes the utility of others, or (ii) maximizes the sum of (the utility of others) plus (10 times one’s own
utility). Like SOU, Schefflerian Utilitarianism has the implausible consequence that only the first and third
options in Variable Parental Sacrifice are permissible. Portmore responds to this objection by arguing that
working only one week of overtime should be impermissible, because you would be “unreasonably selfish”
to sacrifice your utility in this inefficient way. If you work two weeks of overtime then others get two-thirds
of the utility you sacrifices, whereas if you work one week of overtime then others get only one half of the
utility you sacrifice.
I think it’s false that non-maximizing self-sacrifices are only permissible when they’re maximally efficient.
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of the most extreme kind. Modest gifts and sacrifices for loved ones would not be per-
missible. Only the most extreme and lavish gifts would be permitted.
This points to a general problem with dual-maximizing theories. The problem is
that dual-maximizing theories are fundamentally disjunctive. They treat maximizing
everyone’s utility and maximizing the appropriately weighted utility of privileged
and disregarded subjects as distinct goals, and take acts to be permissible iff they’re
the best at achieving either of these goals. But by treating these goals as distinct,
they’re unable to allow for natural trade-offs between them.
How might one modify dual-maximizing theories in order to allow for such trade-
offs? Here is one natural thought. The difference between the first and second goals
of SOU can be seen as a difference in the value of the weight w. The first goal –
maximizing utility – is a case where w = 1, and the utility of disregarded subjects isn’t
discounted, while the second goal – maximizing the utility of the privileged subjects –
is a case where w = 0 and the utility of disregarded subjects is completely discounted.
So if we want to allow for tradeoffs between these two goals, one natural thought is
to permit any act which maximizes weighted utility for any value of w between these
two extremes.
Unfortunately, this natural thought doesn’t pan out. On this proposal, the total
weighted utility of each act will be:
Options Self Child Weighted Total
Don’t Work Overtime: 10w 10 10 + 10w
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8w 11 11 + 8w
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7w 12 12 + 7w
But no value of w will make working one week of overtime maximize weighted util-
ity. If w = 1, then not working overtime will yield a higher weighted utility (20) than
working one week of overtime (19). And if w < 1, then working two weeks of over-
time will yield a higher weighted utility than working one week of overtime. This is
because working one week of overtime is just like working two weeks of overtime,
except it shifts one unit of utility from your child to yourself. And since we’re dis-
counting the utility assigned to you (because w < 1), this shift will decrease weighted
utility.
Why does working one week of overtime seem permissible? It seems permissible
because it seems you should be free to determine how much of your utility you’re
willing to sacrifice. You can choose not to sacrifice any of your utility and not work
overtime, you can choose to sacrifice a lot of utility, and work two weeks of overtime,
or you can choose to just sacrifice some of your utility – up to two utility, say – and
work one week of overtime. The problem with the natural thought sketched above is
that what we want to vary is not the degree to which you discount your utility, but the
amount of utility which you’re willing to discount.
That stance would entail that if we could make a sacrifice to work a week of overtime to buy our child a
present, but could also make a more efficient sacrifice by selling our leg in order to allow our child to go to
college, then only selling our leg (or making no sacrifice at all) would be permissible. This is implausible.
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Let’s turn to theories which allow us to do that.
3 Variable-Disregarding Theories
3.1 The Structure of Variable-Disregarding Theories
In this section I’ll introduce variable-disregarding theories. In the interest of accessibility,
I’ll introduce them in two stages. In section 3.1.1 I’ll describe these theories informally.
Then in section 3.1.2 I’ll describe these theories more formally, in a manner mirroring
my presentation of dual-maximizing theories in section 2.1.
3.1.1 Variable-Disregarding Theories, Take I
We want to modify Utilitarianism to permit giving less weight to the utility of some
group of subjects. And, as we saw in the last section, we also want our theory to
consider various amounts of utility that we might discount. Let’s look at one way to
do this.
There are some acts that will bring about more utility for a group than any other
act; i.e, will bring about the maximum utility for that group.10 And there are other acts
that will lead to drops in utility for this group, relative to this maximum. One way to
give less weight to the utility of this group is to assign less importance to these drops
– that is, to treat their effective utility as closer to their maximum than it really is. So
suppose we’re giving no weight to the utility of a subject. If their maximum utility is
10, and their utility given a certain act is 6, we can disregard this drop in their utility
by treating their utility as 10 for the purposes of evaluating this act. Alternatively,
suppose we’re giving half weight to the utility of a subject. If their maximum utility
is 10, and their utility given a certain act is 6, we can give half weight to this drop in
their utility by treating their utility as 8 for the purposes of evaluating this act.
Now, we also want the theory to permit discounting various amounts of utility.
Here is one way to do that. Consider different magnitudes of drops in utility. Some
acts will maximize effective utility if we discount drops in a group’s utility of up to
some positive finite size. Some acts will maximize effective utility if we discount all
drops in a group’s utility (equivalently: will maximize effective utility if we discount
all drops in a group’s utility of up to size ∞). And some acts will maximize utility
simpliciter (equivalently: will maximize effective utility if we discount all drops in a
group’s utility of up to size 0). We can ensure that our theory permits discounting
various amounts of utility by taking all of these different acts to be permissible.
Putting these thoughts together, we can say that an act is permissible iff, for some
amount of utility, discounting drops in a group’s utility of up to that amount makes
10In certain infinity cases, there will be no act that maximizes utility; I’m bracketing such complications
here (cf. footnote 12).
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the act maximize effective utility.11 I’ll call a theory of permissible action of this form
a variable-disregarding theory.
Let’s work through an example. Suppose we want a variable-disregarding theory
that allows you to give no weight to the utility of those you don’t feel close to. Then
we can take an act to be permissible iff there’s some amount of utility of those you’re
not close to that you can disregard which makes that act maximize effective utility.
So consider the following case:
Dividing Goods: You’re considering whether to split some good evenly between a
friend of yours and a stranger, or give all of the good to your friend. If you split
the good evenly both will get a fair amount of utility, whereas if you give all of
it to your friend, your friend’s utility will be slightly higher, but the stranger’s
utility will be much lower.
We might represent your options in Dividing Goods as follows:
Options Friend Stranger Total
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 15
Which of these acts is permissible?
Let’s start with Split Evenly. Is there some amount of utility of the stranger which
you can discount which makes Split Evenly maximize effective utility? Here the an-
swer is trivially yes – if we don’t discount any amount of utility, then Split Evenly will
maximize utility. So Split Evenly is permissible.
Now consider Favor Friend. Is there some amount of utility of the stranger which
you can discount which makes Favor Friend maximize effective utility? Well, sup-
pose we discount an arbitrarily large amount of the stranger’s utility. Favor Friend
drops the utility of the stranger by 4, relative to Split Evenly. And if we give that
drop in utility no weight — we give it none of the importance we normally would —
then we can treat the stranger’s effective utility as 9. So the total effective utility of
Favor Friend will be 19. By contrast, disregarding drops in the stranger’s utility won’t
change the effective utility of Split Evenly, since in Split Evenly there’s no drop in the
stranger’s utility to disregard. Thus the effective utility of Split Evenly will still be 18.
Since Favor Friend has a higher effective utility, it follows that Favor Friend is also
permissible.
Options Friend Stranger Effective Total
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 (9) 19
(Of course, we didn’t have to discount an arbitrarily large amount of the stranger’s
utility to get this result. Discounting drops in the stranger’s utility of up size 4 would
yield the same result.)
11I’m simplifying slightly here by talking in terms of a group’s utility instead of the utility of individuals
in a group; for a more precise presentation, see section 3.1.2.
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Now consider a different theory. Suppose we wanted a theory that only allows
you to partially disregard – say, give half weight to – the utility of those you’re not
close to. What acts would be permissible in Dividing Goods?
As before, Split Evenly will be permissible, since if we don’t disregard any utility,
Split Evenly will maximize effective utility. What about Favor Friend? Is there some
amount of utility of the stranger you can partially disregard (give half weight to)
according to which Favor Friend maximizes effective utility?
Well, suppose we discount an arbitrarily large amount of the stranger’s utility.
Favor Friend decreases the stranger’s utility by 4. And if we give that drop in utility
half weight — we give it half of the importance we normally would — then we can
treat the stranger’s effective utility as 7. So the total effective utility of Favor Friend
will be 17, while the total effective utility of Split Evenly will remain 18. So Favor
Friend will not maximize effective utility in this case either.
Options Friend Stranger Effective Total
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 (7) 17
More generally, a little thought reveals that there’s no amount of utility we can
discount which will make Favor Friend maximize effective utility. So if we’re required
to give the stranger’s utility at least half weight, giving all of the good to your friend
is impermissible.
3.1.2 Variable-Disregarding Theories, Take II
Now let’s formulate variable-disregarding theories more precisely.
Let’s begin by introducing some terminology. As in section 2.1, let φ be the con-
dition that picks out the subjects we’re disregarding, and let w ∈ [0, 1] be the weight
assigned to the utility of the disregarded subjects. Let ua(s) be the utility of subject s
given act a. And let MAXs be the maximum utility that subject s could end up with in a
given decision problem.12 (Thus in Dividing Goods, MAXfriend is 10, and MAXstranger
is 9.)
Now let’s introduce the effective utility(φ,w,v)(a) of an act a, where v is a sequence
of values v = {vs1 , vs2 , ...} assigned to the φ-subjects that corresponds to the amount
of their utility we’re discounting. The effective utility(φ,w,v)(a) of an act a is the sum for
each subject s of (1) MAXs − w(MAXs − ua(s)), if (given a) s satisfies condition φ and
s’s utility is within vs of MAXs, or (2) ua(s), otherwise.
So when w = 0, the effective utility(φ,0,v) of an act is just the sum of the utilities
of each subject, with the following exception: if a subject satisfies φ, and has a utility
12In certain infinity cases there might not be a maximum utility a subject could have. (E.g., a case in
which you can choose any natural number n, and receive that much utility.) Since such cases pose problems
for both standard-maximizing theories and variable-disregarding theories, I’ll ignore these complications
here.
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within vs of their maximum, then we treat their utility as that maximum. So the effec-
tive utility(φ,0,v) of an act ignores drops in utility of up to size vs for each subject s who
satisfies φ.
When w > 0, these drops in utility aren’t ignored, just given less weight. So when
w = 0.5, the effective utility(φ,0.5,v) of an act is the sum of the utilities of each subject,
except that subjects who satisfy φ and have a utility within vs of their maximum are
treated as having a utility that’s only half as far from their maximum as it actually is;
e.g., if their utility is 6 and their maximum is 10, they’re treated as having a utility of
8. Thus the effective utility(φ,0.5,v) of an act gives half weight to drops in utility of up
to size vs for each subject s who satisfies φ.
With this terminology in hand, we can formulate variable-disregarding theories as
follows, with respect to some condition φ that picks out the disregarded subjects, and
some weight w ∈ [0, 1] that corresponds to the degree to which disregarded subjects
are taken into account:
Variable-Disregarding Theories: An act a is permissible iff, for some assignment v of
values to subjects who satisfy φ, a maximizes effective utility(φ,w,v).
So when w = 0, variable-disregarding theories tell us that a is permissible iff
there’s some assignment of values v to the φ-subjects such that disregarding drops
in utility of up to those amounts makes a maximize effective utility. And when w > 0,
variable-disregarding theories tell us that a is permissible iff there’s some assignment
of values v to φ-subjects such that partially disregarding (to a degree determined by
w) drops in utility of up to those amounts makes a maximize effective utility.
Let me pause for a moment to say a bit more about the roles of φ, w and v. The
first two are parameters that are fixed by a variable-disregarding theory. In spelling
out what variable-disregarding theory we’re using, we have to specify a particular
condition φ and a particular value w. By contrast, the vs – the amounts we’re dis-
regarding – are not fixed by a variable-disregarding theory. For any given variable-
disregarding theory, we consider all of the different possible vs – all of the different
possible amounts of utility we might disregard. And we take an act to be permissible
iff, for at least one of these vs, that act maximizes effective utility.
To get a feel for this terminology, let’s work through the Dividing Goods case
again. Suppose we adopt a variable-disregarding theory that allows you to disre-
gard the utility of those you don’t feel close to. So φ is the condition of being someone
you don’t feel close to; call this condition nc. And let’s suppose the theory allows you
to completely disregard the utility of those you’re not close to, so that w = 0. Recall
that your options in the Dividing Goods case are as follows:
Options Friend Stranger Total
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 15
If we set vstranger = 0, and so don’t disregard any drops in the stranger’s utility,
then Split Evenly maximizes effective utility(nc,0,0):
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Options Friend Stranger Effective Total (v = 0)
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 15
If we set vstranger = ∞, and so disregard drops in the stranger’s utility of any size, then
Favor Friend maximizes effective utility(nc,0,∞):
Options Friend Stranger Effective Total (v = ∞)
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 (9) 19
Since each act maximizes effective utility for some value of v, this theory takes both
acts to be permissible.
Suppose instead we adopt a more plausible theory on which w = 0.5, so that we
can only partially disregard drops in utility for those we’re not close to. If we set
vstranger = ∞, then we’ll give half weight to drops in the stranger’s utility (because
w = 0.5), and we’ll do so for drops in utility of any size (because vstranger = ∞). Thus
Split Evenly will maximize effective utility(nc,0.5,∞):
Options Friend Stranger Effective Total (v = ∞)
Split Evenly: 9 9 18
Favor Friend: 10 5 (7) 17
More generally, one can show that Split Evenly will maximize effective utility for any
value of v. Thus if w = 0.5, we’ll get the result that only Split Evenly is permissible.
In what follows, we’ll mostly focus on cases in which w = 0 and the utility of
disregarded subjects is completely discounted. To simplify notation, I’ll leave the w
index implicit when it’s clear that w = 0.
Variable-disregarding theories share all of the advantages of dual-maximizing the-
ories. We can use them to permit self-centered options, options which favor one’s
friends and family, and options which favor others. And variable-disregarding theo-
ries will also allow for a broad range of supererogatory acts.
Just as dual-maximizing theories are a special case of multi-maximizing theories,
variable-disregarding theories are a special case of what we might call “multivariable-
disregarding theories”, which allow for any number of different disregarded groups
with different weights. But for simplicity, I’ll focus on variable-disregarding theories
in what follows.13
13Let φ1, ..., φm be a sequence of conditions, and let vi = {vs1i , v
s2
i , ...} be a sequence of values assigned to
the φi-subjects. Let the effective utility(φ1,...,φm ,w1,...,wm ,v1,...,vm)(a) of an act a in a given decision problem be the
sum over each subject s of (1) MAXs −wi(MAXs − ua(s)), if (given a) for some i, s satisfies φi and s’s utility
is within vis of MAXs, or (2) us(a), otherwise.
We can formulate multivariable-disregarding theories, with respect to m conditions φi with associated
weights wi, as follows:
Multivariable-disregarding Theories: An act a is permissible iff, for some m assignments v1, ..., vm of val-
ues to subjects, a maximizes effective utility(φ1,...,φm ,w1,...,wm ,v1,...,vm).
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3.2 Self-Discounting Utilitarianism
Suppose we want to handle Parental Sacrifice by modifying Utilitarianism to allow us
to disregard ourselves. As we’ve seen, we can do this by adopting a dual-maximizing
theory, SOU. But we can also do this by adopting a variable-disregarding theory. Tak-
ing the condition φ to be being oneself (call this condition s), and taking the associated
weight to be w = 0 yields the following theory:
Self-Discounting Utilitarianism (SDU): An act a is permissible iff, for some value v,
a maximizes effective utility(s,v).
So SDU tells us that a is permissible iff there’s some value v such that disregarding
drops in one’s own utility of up to that amount makes a maximize utility.
SDU yields the desired prescriptions in Parental Sacrifice. If we set v = 0, and
so don’t disregard any drops in our utility, then not working overtime maximizes
effective utility(s,0):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 11 19
If we set v = ∞, and so disregard drops of any amount to our utility, then working
overtime maximizes effective utility(s,∞):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = ∞)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
Thus both options are permissible.
Unlike SOU, SDU also yields the desired prescriptions in Variable Parental Sacri-
fice. If we set v = 0, and so don’t disregard drops of any amount to our utility, then
not working overtime maximizes effective utility(s,0):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 11 19
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 12 19
If we set v = 2, and so disregard drops of up to 2 units to our utility, then working
one week of overtime maximizes effective utility(s,2):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 2)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 12 19
If we set v = ∞, and so disregard drops of any amount to our utility, then working
two weeks of overtime maximizes effective utility(s,∞):
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Options Self Child Effective Total (v = ∞)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 (10) 12 22
So SDU yields the desired result that all three options are permissible.
3.3 Further Problems
SOU yields plausible verdicts in Parental Sacrifice, and SDU yields plausible verdicts
in both Parental Sacrifice and Variable Parental Sacrifice. But both SOU and SDU
yield strange results in cases where other subjects are willing to make sacrifices as
well, such as the following:
Two Parental Sacrifices: Your child’s birthday is coming up. You have the option of
working overtime in order to buy your child a gift. Doing so would significantly
decrease the utility of both you and your partner – the decrease for each of you
would be greater than the utility your child would receive from the gift. But
your partner is willing to make the sacrifice, and no one else’s utility would be
affected.
In this case we might represent your options as follows:
Options Self Partner, Child Total
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 8, 11 27
According to SOU it will be impermissible to work overtime, since doing so maxi-
mizes neither total utility nor the utility of everyone else. Likewise, according to SDU
it will be impermissible to work overtime, since regardless of how much of your util-
ity we disregard, not working overtime will maximize effective utility(s,v). If v < 2,
then the effective utility(s,v) of not working overtime will be 30 instead of 27:
Options Self Partner, Child Effective Total (v < 2)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 8, 11 27
And if v ≥ 2, then the effective utility(s,v) of not working overtime will be 30 instead
of 29:
Options Self Partner, Child Effective Total (v ≥ 2)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 8, 11 29
So no matter what we set v to, not working overtime maximizes effective utility. Thus
SDU takes not working overtime to be obligatory.
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These are implausible verdicts, especially when combined with the verdicts SOU
and SDU make in Parental Sacrifice. If it’s permissible for you to willingly sacrifice
some of your well-being for your child, then it should be permissible for your partner
to do so as well. The fact that in Two Parental Sacrifices your partner cannot them-
selves act in order to make this sacrifice doesn’t seem morally relevant.
Moreover, if we accept SOU or SDU, we have to accept an odd conflict between
our permissions and those of others. To see this, return to the Parental Sacrifice case.
When it’s the parent making the decision, SOU and SDU both yield the verdict that
it’s permissible for the parent to work overtime. But suppose that working overtime
also requires the parent’s manager to sign off. Then it will be the manager making the
decision. And since the manager isn’t one of the parties involved, SOU and SDU will
both yield the same verdicts as standard Utilitarianism, namely, that it’s impermissi-
ble for the parent work overtime. So while SOU and SDU allow the parent to make
this self-sacrifice, it won’t allow the manager to let this self-sacrifice take place.
This yields an uncomfortable tension between our permissions and those of oth-
ers. While SOU and SDU will permit you to make self-sacrifices, they’ll also require
everyone else to prevent you from doing so. This has the consequence that it would
be virtually impossible to carry out these self-sacrifices in a society where everyone
did the right thing. This is because most of our potential sacrifices require the acqui-
escence of others to go through, and others would be forbidden from allowing these
sacrifices to take place. Banking agents would be obligated to not allow the relevant
checks to clear, store owners would be obligated to not sell the relevant products to
the relevant people, bosses would be obligated to refuse to allow the relevant people
to work overtime, and so on. This would be a strange state of affairs.
Let’s take a step back. Two Parental Sacrifices seems similar in morally relevant
respects to Parental Sacrifice and Variable Parental Sacrifice, and it seems the expla-
nation of why it’s permissible to work overtime in each case should be the same. But
while a self-other asymmetry could potentially explain the permissibility of work-
ing overtime in Parental Sacrifice and Variable Parental Sacrifice, it can’t explain the
permissibility of working overtime in Two Parental Sacrifices. For in Two Parental
Sacrifices, working overtime doesn’t just lower your utility (which a self-other asym-
metry could allow you to ignore), it also lowers the net utility of others. Thus we have
reason to be skeptical that a self-other asymmetry is what’s at the heart of these cases.
More generally, this suggests that the various authors who have taken Utilitarian-
ism to have a special problem with “altruistic” objections have missed the forest for
the trees. They’ve identified a particular batch of problem cases, and have taken those
problem cases to encapsulate the whole problem. What cases like Two Paternal Sac-
rifices show is that these “altruistic” objections are really just an instance of a broader
interpersonal phenomena. And in order to address this broader phenomenon, we




In his discussion of these “altruistic” objections, Slote raises the following thought:
“It has been suggested to me that the reason we are allowed to harm our-
selves or avoid some benefit, where we should not be permitted to harm
another person or prevent her from receiving a similar benefit, lies in the
consent implicit in actions we do to ourselves. If I harm myself to avoid a
benefit, I presumably do this willingly, whereas the agent whom I refuse to
benefit does not consent to this neglect (and when she does there is nothing
wrong with what I do). It might be then thought that the moral asymmetry
we have noted is not a deep feature of morality, but rather derivative from
and justifiable in terms of the moral importance of consent.”14
Although Slote goes on to reject this suggestion, I think this is exactly right. The key
moral distinction in these cases is not the distinction between self and others, it’s the
distinction between those who consent and those who do not.
If this thought is correct, then the modification of Utilitarianism suggested in sec-
tion 3.2 is too cautious. Instead of modifying standard Utilitarianism to permit dis-
regarding oneself, we should modify it to permit disregarding those who consent.
That is, we should change the condition φ picking out who we can disregard from
“oneself” to “those who consent to the act”. Then we can explain the appearance of a
self-other asymmetry in such cases as deriving from the asymmetry in what subjects
typically consent to.15
In some of the literature, the term “consent” is used to mean something like waiv-
ing a right, or releasing someone from a duty to you.16 That is, consent is used to
mean something which is by definition morally significant. This is not how I’m us-
ing the term “consent”. I’m using the term “consent” in its more colloquial sense, to
denote something like agreement or acquiescence. And while one might plausibly
take agreement or acquiescence to have moral significance, we can use these notions
without presupposing that they have moral significance.
It’s plausible that consent (so understood) must satisfy certain conditions in order
to be morally relevant. For example, we might want to require the consenting subject
to be informed, competent, free from coercion, and so on, in order for their consent
to count. For now, I’ll simply take for granted that there are some conditions of this
14See Slote (1984), p.190-191.
15The suggestion is that this apparent self-other asymmetry can be explained in terms of consent. It is
not that all self-other asymmetries can be explained in terms of consent. For example, if one chooses to deal
with “demandingness” objections by allowing agents to partially disregard the utility of others, then one
is positing a kind of self-other asymmetry. But this self-other asymmetry cannot be explained in terms of
consent.
16E.g., see Liberto (2017).
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kind, and I’ll call consent that satisfies these conditions “morally relevant consent”,
or “consentm” for short. We’ll return to examine the question of what consentm is in
section 4.2.
Now let’s return to the task at hand: formulating a theory that permits disregard-
ing those who consent. We can construct a variable-disregarding theory that does this
by taking the condition φ to be consentm to the act in question (call this condition c),
and taking the associated weight to be w = 0:
Consent-Discounting Utilitarianism (CDU): An act a is permissible iff, for some as-
signment of values v to subjects who satisfy c, a maximizes effective utilityc,v.
So CDU tells us that a is permissible iff there’s some assignment of values v to sub-
jects such that disregarding drops in utility of up to those amounts for subjects who
consentm to a makes a maximize utility.17
Now let’s see how CDU handles the three cases we’ve discussed. In all of these
cases you consentm to whichever action you perform, and for concreteness I’ll assume
your child also consentsm, though we get the same results regardless of whether your
child consentsm or not. Let’s start with Parental Sacrifice. If we set v = {0, 0} (i.e., set
vself = 0 and vchild = 0), then not working overtime maximizes effective utility(c,{0,0}):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 0, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 11 19
And if we set v = {∞, 0}, then working overtime will maximize effective utility(c,{∞,0}):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = ∞, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
So CDU will take both options to be permissible.
Now consider Variable Parental Sacrifice. If we set v = {0, 0} (i.e., set vself = 0 and
vchild = 0), then not working overtime maximizes effective utility(c,{0,0}):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 0, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 11 19
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 12 19
If we set v = {2, 0}, then working one week of overtime maximizes effective utility(c,{2,0}):
17Note that although I’ve described CDU as disregarding drops in utility of those who consent, it also
effectively disregards increases in utility of those who don’t consent to the increase. E.g., consider a subject
who doesn’t consent to the option a that maximizes their utility, and instead prefers an option b that brings
them a lower utility instead. Since the subject consents to b, they’ll treated as if they had the utility they
would have given a for the purposes of evaluating b, and thus the increase in utility that a brings them
won’t end up telling in favor of a.
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Options Self Child Effective Total (v = 2, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 12 19
And if we set v = {∞, 0}, then working two weeks of overtime maximizes effective
utility(c,{∞,0}):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = ∞, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 (10) 11 21
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7 (10) 12 22
So CDU will take all three options to be permissible.
Now consider Two Parental Sacrifices. In this case there’s a third subject, your
partner, who will also consentm to whatever act you perform. If we set v = {0, 0, 0}
(i.e., set vself = 0, vpartner = 0, and vchild = 0), then not working overtime maximizes
effective utility(c,{0,0,0}):
Options Self Partner, Child Effective Total (v = 0, 0, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 8, 11 27
And if we set v = {∞, ∞, 0}, then working overtime maximizes effective utility(c,{∞,∞,0}):
Options Self Partner, Child Effective Total (v = ∞, ∞, 0)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 8 (10), 11 31
So CDU will take both options to be permissible.
4.2 Morally Relevant Consent
4.2.1 Informed, Competent, and Uncoerced Consent
Now let’s consider what kinds of conditions we want an account of consentm to take
into consideration.18
First, we want consentm to require that the subject is informed. If a subject would
consent to having their money taken, but only because they’ve been deceived into
18In addition to the informed, competent, and uncoerced conditions described below, some have sug-
gested to me that one might add a fourth condition that requires the act to line up with the subject’s desires
or deep commitments in order for them to consentm. (For a discussion of a view along these lines, see Kil-
loren (2019).) This clause would rule out consent that was merely made because the subject was trying to be
nice, or felt obligated to consent, even though they didn’t really want to. This is an interesting suggestion,
and I take a version of CDU incorporating such a clause to be a viable option.
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thinking that they’d get it back, we should not take them to be consentingm. Likewise,
if a subject would consent to giving up their salary bonus, but only because they
falsely believe that if they do, it will go to charity, we should not take them to be
consentingm.19
Second, we want consentm to require that the subject is competent. If a subject
would consent to being lit on fire, but only because they’re mentally ill, we should
not take them to be consentingm. Likewise, if a subject would consent to having all of
their property taken, but only because they’re very young or on powerful drugs, we
should not take them to be consentingm.20
Adding this competence clause raises a potential worry. Suppose one identifies
competence with rationality. On some conceptions of rationality, a rational agent
would never consent to a decrease in utility, and never dissent to an increase in utility.
If so, and we require competence for consentm, then no one will ever consentm to acts
which decrease their utility. But then CDU becomes equivalent to standard Utilitari-
anism, since the deviations from maximizing utility that CDU allows will never come
into play.
This worry requires an understanding of competence that equates “competent”
with “ideally prudentially rational”, or something of that kind. This strong under-
standing of the competence condition is not what I have in mind. The notion of com-
petence I have in mind here is something weaker, something like the kind of compe-
tence required in order for one’s actions to be subject to moral evaluation. For exam-
ple, normal human adults might be thought to be subject to such evaluation, while
dogs are not. Thus one might take normal human adults, but not dogs, to be compe-
tent.21 And if we assess CDU using this weaker notion of competence, this worry will
not arise.
Third, we want consentm to require that the subject is uncoerced. Suppose you live
under the rule of a sadistic dictator, who can scan your brain to detect whether you’ve
consented to various things. And suppose the dictator will scan your brain and react
as follows: if you consent to their cutting off your hand then they will do so, and if
you do not consent to their cutting off your hand then they will kill you. If you know
all of this then you might reasonably consent to them cutting off your hand. But we
19For some discussions of how to spell out the notion of informed consent, see Manson and O’Neill
(2007), Beauchamp and Childress (2008) and Eyal (2012).
20For a discussion of some of the issues that arise with respect to assessing competence, see Grisso and
Appelbaum (1998), Beauchamp and Childress (2008) and Charland (2011).
21Granted, this notion of competence seems to come in degrees. Likewise, the extent to which a subject’s
actions are subject to moral evaluation seems to come in degrees (see Charland (2011)). If one wanted to
take this into consideration, one might consider modifying CDU to take degrees of competent consent into
account. Alternatively, one might simply take the strength of deontic obligations to be something which
admits of variable degree – a highly competent agent can do something wrong, while a barely competent
agent can only do something wrong. These are interesting issues, but not ones I’ll take up here. For simplicity,
I’ll simply proceed on the assumption that a binary notion of competence will suffice.
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should not take you to be consentingm to their cutting off your hand.22
4.2.2 Actual versus Ideal Consent
We want consentm to be informed, competent, and uncoerced. But there are a couple
different ways in which one might incorporate these kinds of conditions into an ac-
count of consentm. First, one might take a subject to consentm to a iff they consent to a
and satisfy the relevant conditions. We might call this the actual way of incorporating
these conditions, since it requires the subject to actually satisfy these conditions in or-
der to count as consentingm. Second, one might take a subject to consentm to a iff the
following counterfactual is true: if the agent were to perform this act, and if s were
informed, competent and uncoerced, then s would consent to the act.23 We might call
this the ideal way of incorporating these conditions, since it only requires an idealized
version of the subject who satisfies these conditions to consent in order for the subject
to count as consentingm.
I take both the actual and ideal approaches to have intuitive appeal.24 And in
some cases our intuitions regarding these approaches conflict. For example, suppose
a member of an isolated tribe with no experience of modern medicine is bleeding to
death. And suppose a medic has found the subject, and must insert a needle into their
arm in order to give them the blood transfusion needed to save their life. In light of the
subject’s lack of familiarity with modern medicine, and their lack of understanding of
what the needle insertion is for, they don’t consent to having the needle inserted into
their arm. But suppose that if the subject were informed of what the needle was for,
and understood that this was necessary to save their life, they would consent.
Now, in this case should we treat the subject as consentingm to have the needle
inserted into their arm? That is, with respect to the morally relevant notion of consent,
should we treat them as consenting? I think most feel torn about this case. On the one
hand, they don’t actually consent to having the needle inserted into their arm, and
that seems morally important. On the other hand, they clearly would consent if they
were appropriately informed, and that seems morally important as well.
I think both ways of understanding consentm are viable. So in what follows, I’ll
leave it open which notion of consentm we’re working with. And in the few places
22Although I’m not taking a stand here on how to understand coercion, those looking for a more concrete
account could do worse than assuming something like Nozick’s (1969) account.
23There are further important details here regarding how we evaluate this counterfactual, of course. In
particular, we want to ensure that when evaluating this counterfactual we prioritize holding fixed facts
regarding the subject’s utility (so that their utility given each act remains unchanged) and other facts re-
garding their personality that bear on whether they’d consent to the act. Pete Graham has suggested that
we might also consider a different notion of ideal consentm linked to a counterfactual that doesn’t have the
performance of the act in the antecedent. This alternative notion of ideal consent would largely yield the
same results, though it would yield a different response to Slote’s first argument discussed in section 5.3
(cf. footnote 33).
24For a discussion of some of the merits and demerits of appealing to something like hypothetical or
ideal consent, see Thomson (1990), Stark (2000), and Enoch (2017).
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where our choice between actual and ideal consentm makes a difference, I’ll note how
these two approaches diverge.
5 Objections
5.1 Objections to Consent Discounting Utilitarianism
Now let’s turn to consider some potential objections to CDU.
One objection to CDU is that in cases where w = 0, it will permit choosing domi-
nated acts – i.e., permit choosing an act even though there’s some other act available
which is strictly better for disregarded subjects, and just as good for privileged ones.
And one might object that this is implausible.
CDU will have this consequence, but this is a consequence we should accept. To
see this, consider a version of Parental Sacrifice in which your child would end up be-
ing equally happy with or without the gift. (While your child would greatly enjoy the
gift, if you didn’t buy it then they would end up finding something else to enjoy.) In
this case, I take it that it’s still permissible for you to work overtime, even though the
option of working overtime is dominated by the option of not working overtime. And
CDU yields this verdict. I.e., if we set v = ∞, then both options maximize effective
utility(c,∞):
Options Self Child Effective Total (v = ∞)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 10 20
And so CDU will take both options to be permissible, as desired.
Likewise, consider a version of Two Parental Sacrifices in which your child would
end up being equally happy with or without the gift. Again, I take it to be permis-
sible for you to work overtime if both you and your partner are willing to make the
sacrifice, even though working overtime is dominated by not working overtime. And
again, CDU yields this verdict. I.e., if we set v = ∞, then both options maximize
effective utility(c,∞):
Options Self Partner, Child Effective Total (v = ∞)
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10, 10 30
Work Overtime: 8 (10) 8 (10), 10 30
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As before, CDU will yield the desired verdict that both options are permissible.25,26
Here is a second objection to CDU. Consider the following variant of Variable
Parental Sacrifice:
Options Self Child Total
Don’t Work Overtime: 10 10 20
Work 1 Week of Overtime: 8 11 19
Work 2 Weeks of Overtime: 7.9 11.9 19.8
CDU will still take working one week of overtime to be permissible, since working
one week of overtime maximizes effective utility(c,{2,0}). But one might worry that
in this case it should be impermissible to work one week of overtime in this case,
since working two weeks of overtime will only cost you an additional 0.1 utility while
granting your child an additional 0.9 utility.
I take the intuition behind this worry to be this: working one week of overtime is
impermissible because, given the other options available, it’s an inefficient sacrifice.
If you work one week of overtime you sacrifice 2 utility to give 1 utility for your child,
while if you work two weeks of overtime you sacrifice 2.1 utility to give 1.9 utility
for you child. And one might hold that if one is going to make a utility-decreasing
sacrifice, then one’s obligated to do so in as efficient manner as possible.
This worry is similar to one I addressed in section 2.3 (in footnote 9). But since it’s
been repeatedly raised in conversation as a worry for CDU, I’ll address it again here.
I think this worry is not compelling because I think it’s false that permissible utility-
decreasing sacrifices must be maximally efficient. That would entail that if we could
work a week of overtime to buy our child a present, or could make a more efficient
sacrifice by selling our leg in order to allow our child to go to college, then only selling
our leg (or making no sacrifice at all) would be permissible. That’s implausible.
25Here is another dominance-violating case that one might take to be more damning. (Thanks to Pete
Graham here.) Suppose someone is drowning, and you can either rescue them (at no cost to yourself) or let
them drown. If the person consents to your letting them drown, CDU would hold that it’s permissible to
do so. But (the objection goes) surely that’s not right.
When we fill in the details regarding this case, we naturally imagine the subject as someone who is
severely depressed, or is suffering from a mental illness of some kind. But such a subject would not be
competent, and so could not consentm to your letting them drown. Thus CDU would not say it’s permissible
to let them drown. Could we fill in the details of this case in a way that makes it plausible that the subject is
informed and competent? I find this very hard to do. But I find that the more I do to make it plausible that
a subject could provide informed and competent consent to your letting them drown, the more plausible
it becomes that it’s permissible to let them drown. (In this respect this case is similar to the brainwashing
case discussed below (see especially footnote 29).)
26CDU’s treatment of these dominance cases entails that it will sometimes violate the kind of “Bang for
your Buck” principle defended by Graham (2019), which (roughly) requires you to “make the most” out of
losses inflicted on others. Thus if we consider a case where I can choose between lowering your utility by
1 to increase my utility by 1, lowering your utility by 1 to increase my utility be 2, or doing nothing, the
first option would be impermissible according to the Bang for your Buck principle. But if you consent to all
three options, then CDU will entail that the first option is permissible.
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I think the right stance to take here is the one I described at the end of section
2.3. Namely, you should be free to determine how much of your utility you’re willing
to sacrifice when performing utility-decreasing altruistic acts. You can choose not to
sacrifice any of your utility and not work overtime, you can choose to sacrifice a lot of
utility and work two weeks of overtime, or you can choose to sacrifice no more than
2 utility, and work one week of overtime.
Here is a third objection to CDU. Consider an evil dictator who has brainwashed
everyone else, so that they now consent to anything they might do. Then it seems
like CDU would make it permissible for the dictator to torture everyone, since they
all consent to this decrease in utility. This seems like the wrong result – it shouldn’t be
permissible for a dictator to do whatever they want just because they’ve brainwashed
everyone.
Of course, everyone wouldn’t consent to being brainwashed in the first place, so
presumably the act of brainwashing itself wouldn’t be permissible. So the evil dic-
tator would still be doing something wrong at some point in the process. But one
might think that, past events aside, the dictator is also doing something wrong now
by torturing everyone.
How the proponent of CDU will reply to this worry depends on the notion of
“brainwashing” in play. On the one hand, everyone may be “brainwashed” in the
sense that they only consent to (say) being tortured by the dictator because they’re not
informed, competent or uncoerced. If they were informed, competent and uncoerced,
they would not consent to being tortured. On this understanding of the case, the
populace consents to being tortured but does not consentm to being tortured. Thus
torturing everyone would be impermissible.27
On the other hand, one might construct a scenario in which everyone is “brain-
washed” to consent in a manner that leaves them informed, competent and unco-
erced. In that case, everyone would consentm to being tortured. This case is hard to
envision – it’s difficult to think of a scenario in which a populace full of informed,
competent and uncoerced subjects would still consent to being tortured. But if they
consent despite being informed, competent and uncoerced, then it sounds like they’re
not so much brainwashed as convinced.28 And if this is how we understand the case,
then it’s not clear it’s wrong for the dictator to torture everyone after all.29
27I take it that this is the way brainwashing is usually understood, since brainwashing is generally taken
to undermine competence.
28On this understanding, we’re employing the term “brainwashed” to mean something like “convinced
of something that radically alters your beliefs or consenting attitudes” or “convinced to adopt beliefs or
consenting attitudes that you (initially) strongly disagreed with”. This does seem to be one way in which
we use the term “brainwashed”. Those who are convinced to enter a cult, for example, are often called
brainwashed, even though in at least some cases it seems like those who enter the cult are competent,
relatively informed, and so on.
29It’s important here not to confuse the plausibility of there being a case in which everyone would con-
sent to being tortured despite being informed, competent and uncoerced, with the plausibility of its being
permissible for the dictator to torture them in such a case. To appropriately evaluate the latter question,
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5.2 Objections to Variable-Disregarding Theories
Now let’s consider an objection to variable-disregarding theories more generally, as a
means of incorporating permissible disregarding into a Utilitarian framework.
The first objection to CDU described in section 5.1 concerned the fact that it’s per-
missible to choose an option that’s dominated by another option which is strictly bet-
ter for disregarded subjects and just as good for privileged ones. I argued that this is a
desirable feature of CDU – if a subject consentsm to an option which leaves them with
a lower utility, then ceteris paribus that option is permissible.
But one might worry that while this reply is plausible in some cases of disregard-
ing, such as those involving consent, it’s not plausible in others. For example, if we
want to modify Utilitarianism to permit disregarding those who you’re not close to,
we surely don’t want to permit acts that do nothing to benefit your friends and family,
but make other people worse off! That is, suppose we set up a choice between acts
like the following:
Options Others Friends and Family Total
a1: 10 10 20
a2: 9 10 19
Surely a2 should be impermissible. If that’s right, then one might worry that while
variable-disregarding theories may correctly model how to permit some kinds of dis-
regarding (e.g., oneself, those who consent), they don’t correctly model how to permit
other kinds of disregarding (e.g., others, those one’s not close to).
I agree that in the above case a2 is impermissible. But this is not an objection to
variable-disregarding theories, it’s an objection to assigning disregarded subjects no
weight in such cases. What distinguishes the two kinds of disregarding just described
(disregarding oneself or those who consent, versus disregarding others or those one’s
not close to) are what weight assignments w to disregarded subjects are plausible.
In the first kind of disregarding – disregarding oneself or those who consent – it’s
plausible to permit completely discounting the utility of the disregarded subjects and
taking w = 0. In the second kind of disregarding – disregarding others or those
one’s not close to – it’s plausible that the utility of disregarded subjects must be given
at least some weight and w > 0. For while morality might allow one to partially
disregard others or those one’s not close to, it surely doesn’t allow us to completely
disregard others or those one’s not close to. And as long as we give some weight to
the utility of the disregarded subjects, then the kinds of dominated options described
above will not be permissible.30
we need to first come up with a case where it seems plausible to us that everyone would consent to being
tortured despite being informed, competent and uncoerced. It’s only when we’ve have managed to flesh
out such a case that we can intuitively evaluate whether it’s plausible in such a case for the dictator to
permissibly torture them. And in my experience, the more we do to make it plausible that everyone would
consent to being tortured despite being informed, competent and uncoerced, the more plausible it becomes
that it’s permissible for the dictator to torture them.
30For example, consider a variable-disregarding view on which the condition φ is not being close to the
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5.3 Slote’s Objections
I’ve suggested that one can accommodate the intuitions behind these “altruistic” ob-
jections by modifying Utilitarianism in order to accommodate the role of consent. But
Slote (1984) has argued that considerations involving consent cannot accommodate
these intuitions. And the proponents of theories like SOU, such as Sider (1993) and
Portmore (2008), have endorsed these arguments for why appealing to consent won’t
work. So let us turn to assess these arguments.
Slote (1984) offers two arguments for why consent won’t suffice to explain these
intuitions. He presents the first argument in the following passage:
“If someone irrationally asks me to harm or kill him, it will presumably
be irrational and wrong of me to kill him, more wrong at any rate than if
I irrationally choose to kill myself; yet the consent seems equal in the two
cases.”31
The argument seems to be this. If someone irrationally consented to my killing them,
it would be wrong for me to kill them. But if I irrationally want to kill myself (and so
consent to doing so), it would not be wrong (or not as wrong) for me to kill myself.
So even though we both (irrationally) consent to an act that kills us, and so the status
of the act with respect to consent is the same, the moral status of these acts is still
different. So consent cannot explain this moral difference.
By “irrational”, I take Slote to mean irrational to a degree which undermines com-
petence. For if we understand Slote to be talking about a notion of irrationality that
doesn’t undermine competence – e.g., merely failing to maximize the subject’s ex-
pected utility – then the claims he makes are not plausible.32
agent (call this condition nc), and suppose the weight assigned to nc-subjects is w = 0.5. And consider the
case described above. If v = {0, 0} then the disregarding utilities(nc,0.5,{0,0}) will be 20 for a1 and 19 for a2.
If v = {∞, ∞} then the disregarding utilities(nc,0.5,{∞,∞}) will be 20 for a1 and 19.5 for a2. But for all v, a1
will have a higher effective utility than a2. Thus a2 will be impermissible, as desired.
31Slote (1984), p.191.
32For example, consider a terminal cancer patient facing an extremely painful death. At times close
enough to their death, it will be rational for them to choose death, since the expected utility of continuing
to live will be negative. At times far enough from their death, it will be irrational to choose death, since the
expected utility of continuing to live will be positive. Now consider a time just before the expected utility
of death flips from positive to negative. And suppose the terminal cancer patient competently requests
euthanasia at this time. This request will count as irrational, but it doesn’t seem wrong to carry out their
request.
Taking a step back, it’s worth highlighting the strangeness of Slote’s claim if we understand his talk of
irrationality to just mean something like failing to maximize expected utility. We’re trying to work out an
account of objective obligation, tracking the actual consequences of our acts. Given this, it seems bizarre
to maintain that the rationality of one’s request – a subjective notion mediated by one’s beliefs about the
consequences – determines the wrongness of one’s acts. To drive this home, consider two terminal cancer
patients who are in identical situations, facing identical futures, who both request euthanasia. Suppose both
patients are, according to the usual standards, informed and competent – perhaps they’re both doctors, and
have a reasonably good grasp of what their future experiences will be like. And suppose that one patient
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Now let us see whether Slote’s argument is compelling. First, let’s assume an ideal
notion of consentm. Suppose that in both cases killing the person would lower their
utility, and that no one else’s utility would be affected. What will CDU say about my
killing someone who incompetently consents to my killing them? To work this out,
we need to assess whether, if they were competent, they would have consented to my
killing them. I take it that in Slote’s example the subject only consents because they’re
not competent – if they were competent, then they wouldn’t consent. If so, then CDU
would say that it’s impermissible for me to kill them, just as Slote says.
What will CDU say about the act of incompetently killing myself? Again, there
is the question of whether, if I were competent, I would consent to my decision to
commit suicide. Here the answer is trivially yes – if I were competent and decided to
kill myself, I would consent to killing myself. So CDU will take it to be permissible
for me to kill myself, just as Slote says. Thus a consent-based account can explain the
moral difference between these two acts.33
Suppose instead that we adopt an actual, instead of ideal, notion of consentm.
Given the way I’ve suggested we understand the notion of competence in section
4.2.1, it follows that if I’m not acting competently, then my act is not subject to moral
evaluation. So if I’m not competent and I kill myself, I can’t be acting wrongly, any
more than a dog who killed itself could be acting wrongly. On the other hand, if some-
one else is not competent, and I kill them, I certainly can be acting wrongly! Again,
we find that a consent-based account can explain the moral difference between these
two acts.
So Slote is incorrect to think that consent-based views cannot yield the desired
verdicts in this case. The moral difference he raises can straightforwardly be cashed
out in terms of consent.
Let’s turn to Slote’s second argument. He presents his second argument in the
following passage:
“If I can avoid either an enduring pain to myself or a short-lived pain to
you, you and I might both agree that it would be foolish of me to prevent
the shorter pain to you; judging the matter objectively, you might not con-
sent to my taking the longer pain upon myself in order to save you from
is slightly more optimistic than the other, so that while living and dying have the same expected utility for
the first patient, living has a slightly higher expected utility than dying for the second patient. According
to Slote (so understood), while it could be objectively permissible to carry out the first patient’s request for
euthanasia, it would be objectively impermissible to carry out the second patient’s request. And this is so
even though they’re in the exact same situation, and facing the exact same futures.
33That said, I’ll confess that my intuitions here are equivocal. If you only kill yourself because you’re
not competent, I find (contra Slote) that the verdict that your act was wrong to be as plausible as the verdict
that your act was permissible. Given this, it’s interesting to note that if we adopt the alternative notion
of ideal consentm suggested by Pete Graham (cf. footnote 23), CDU will hold that killing yourself in these
circumstances would be impermissible after all. (That’s because, given this alternative notion, you won’t
ideally consentm to your suicidal act, and so your utility won’t be disregarded. Thus the act will be judged
according to the usual Utilitarian calculus, and the act of killing yourself will be judged impermissible.)
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the shorter pain. Yet there would be nothing morally wrong... in such a
sacrifice. But when the positions are reversed and I can avoid a short-lived
pain to myself or a longer-lived one to you and it is morally right that I
should do the latter, you will presumably not consent to my doing the for-
mer and it will be wrong if I do so. Again, consent or lack of consent seems
not to make the relevant common-sense moral difference.”34
The argument seems to be this. If you don’t consent to my performing an act a1 which
would impose a large decrease in my utility to prevent a small decrease in your utility,
it would still be permissible for me to do a1. But if you don’t consent to my perform-
ing an act b1 which would impose a large decrease in your utility to prevent a small
decrease in my utility, it would not be permissible for me to do b1. Since you don’t
consent to either, consent cannot explain the difference in moral status of these two
acts.
Let us see whether this argument is compelling. Assume that these acts will have
no effect on the utility of anyone else. And assume that both I and the other person in
question are informed, competent and uncoerced.
What will CDU say about my performing act a1, which brings about a large de-
crease in my utility to prevent a small decrease in your utility, versus act a2 in which
I do nothing? From the description of the case, we can assume that I consentm to
whichever act I perform, but the other person only consentsm to my performing a2. If
we set v = {∞, ∞} (i.e., set vself = ∞ and vother = ∞) this yields the result that both
acts maximize effective utility(c,{∞,∞}):
Options Self Other Effective Total (v = ∞, ∞)
a1: 5 (10) 11 21
a2: 10 10 (11) 21
Thus CDU will take a1 to be permissible.
What will CDU say about my performing act b1, which brings about a large de-
crease in your utility to prevent a small decrease in my utility, versus act b2 in which
I do nothing? From the description of the case, we can assume that I consentm to
whichever act I perform, but the other person only consentsm to my performing b2.
And inverting the utilities above gives us the following values:
Options Self Other Total
b1: 11 5 16
b2: 10 10 20
With a little thought we can see that b2 will maximize effective utility given any as-
signment v. For the disregarding utilities for b2 can range from 20-21, while the disre-
garding utilities for b1 will always be 16. So CDU will take b1 to be impermissible.
34Slote (1984), p.191.
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So again, Slote is incorrect to think that consent-based views cannot yield the de-
sired verdicts in this case. As before, the difference he raises can be straightforwardly
cashed out in terms of consent.35
6 Conclusion
One common complaint about Utilitarianism is that it doesn’t allow agents to dis-
regard anyone. For example, as altruistic objections like Parental Sacrifice show, it
doesn’t allow agents to disregard their own well-being. In response to these com-
plaints, a number of authors have endorsed replacing Utilitarianism with dual-maximizing
(or multi-maximizing) views, and have endorsed handling altruistic objections by
adopting something like Sider’s (1993) Self-Other Utilitarianism.
I’ve argued that these suggestions are off-track in two respects. First, I’ve argued
that if we want to modify Utilitarianism to permit disregarding, we should adopt
variable-disregarding views, not dual-maximizing views. Second, I’ve argued that
upon closer examination, the cases that motivate positing this kind of self-other asym-
metry reveal that the morally relevant distinction is not between self and other, it’s
between those who do and do not consent. And by combining these two insights
– adopting a variable-disregarding view which disregards those who consent – we
end up with an attractive theory that yields the desired verdicts in a broad range of
cases.36
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